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E P I S T E M I C I N T E R P R E T A T I O N O F 
C O N D I T I O N A L S 
The presence of a connection between conditionals and conditional 
probabilities has been pointed out by several authors (the first, to my 
knowledge, was E. W. Adams in his (1965).) The epistemic Interpretation 
of conditionals given here will not refer to conditional probability 
directly, but is based on the logic of conditional belief. Conditional 
beliefs, however, can be derived from conditional subjective probabilities. 
The connection between this form of Epistemic Logic and the logic 
of conditionals is threefold: (a) conditional belief constitutes a model 
of the axioms of Conditional Logic; (b) an epistemic interpretation of 
conditionals is in a sense natural; (c) as R. C. Stalnaker points out in 
his paper (1970), an epistemic interpretation of conditionals may give 
us further insight into their formal properties, about which there seems 
to be far less agreement than there is about the logic of probability. 
Following a few introductory remarks in Section I, we shall develop 
a logic of conditional belief, in Section II; then go on to show it to be a 
model of the axioms of Conditional Logic, in Section III; discuss the 
consequences of such an interpretation of conditionals for sentences with 
iterated applications of "if-then", in Section IV, and finally, in Section V , 
argue to the effect that an epistemic interpretation of conditionals is 
adequate. 
i 
Epistemic Logic is the logic of believing and knowing. Since knowing 
can be defined in terms of believing and being right, its basic concept is 
that of belief. There are several such concepts. First we have to distinguish 
between descriptive and rational concepts of belief. A descriptive concept 
"Person a believes that p" might roughly be defined by "If a understands 
the question 'Is it the case that pT and answers truthfully, he will answer 
' Y e s " \ There is no logic of such a concept, since a might believe the most 
absurd things. He might believe logically false propositions; he might 
believe A and B9 but not A A B9 etc. Just as Formal Logic is not interested 
in describing how people actually argue, and the logic of subjective 
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probability is not interested in describing the degrees of probability 
people actually assign to propositions, so is Epistemic Logic interested 
only in rational principles of believing, and could therefore be used 
only with completely rational people for descriptive purposes. To empha-
size the distinction we shall also express the rational concept of belief 
by saying a has reason to believe that p instead of a believes that p. 
Among the rational concepts of belief there are classificatory, com-
parative and metric concepts. Since a metric concept of belief has to be 
based upon a comparative concept, and classificatory concepts can be 
defined by comparative concepts, but not vice versa, a comparative 
concept of belief suggests itself as the basic notion of Epistemic Logic. 
There is, however, one further distinction to be made: There are absolute 
(2-place) and conditional (4-place) relations of comparative belief (and 
therefore of classificatory and metric belief). Since the absolute concept 
can again be defined by the conditional concept, füll generality is achieved 
by starting from the 4-place relation as basic concept. 
Since there are no logical principles that teil us what one person, a, 
has reason to believe if another person, b, has reason to believe such-and-
such, the basic sentences can be written in the form A, B^. C, D: 
For the person or persons referred to B is at most as much reason to believe 
that A, as D is reason to believe that C ; i.e., it is not necessary to mention 
explicitly the person or persons referred to, just as in Probability Logic 
we write p(A)=r instead of pa(A)= r, where r is the (subjective) probabil-
ity assigned to A by person a. A9 B^. C, D can also be read as "On con-
dition that B, A is at most as subjectively probable as C, on condition 
that D " . The logic of such statements is therefore nothing eise than the 
logic of comparative conditional subjective probability. 
Since our aim here is to interpret conditionals by classificatory state-
ments of belief, we shall not discuss the logic of sentences A, B^. C, D.1 
We may define our classificatory concept of conditional belief by 
B(A, C): = C,C^.A.C, but we shall take the operator B as a basic 
constant here and refer to the concept ^ . only briefly in justifying the 
semantics given for B. 
li 
Let LB be the language containing all sentences of predicate logic and 
the sentence B(A, C) where A and C are sentences. 
D l . A n interpretation of LB is to be a quadruple <(ƒ, ƒ, b> such that: 
(1) U is a non-empty set of objects (the universe of discourse); 
(2) I is a non-empty set of worlds; 
(3) b(i9 X) is, for all iel and all I c / , a subset of I such that 
(a) b{i9X)aX9 
(b) X c y A JT) # 4 s 60', 10 * 
(c) ;r c Y A y) n X * A b(i9 X) = b{i9 y ) n JT, 
(d) 165,, where S,: = L W » 
(e) jeb{iy I) => 6(i, Y) = Z> (y, 7) for all 7 c I andye/; 
(f) jeS^Sj-Sr, 
(4) For all i'e ƒ, <Pt is a function from the set of sentences of LB 
into {f, ƒ } such that: 
(a) #,-(a) = <Pj (a) for all individual constants a of L 5 and all je I; 
(b) * f fulfills the conditions for interpretations set down in 
Predicate Logic; 
(c) *t(B{A9Q) = t = b(i9C)c[A] 
where [A]: = {iel: $t(A) = t} andè( i , C):=*(/, [C]). 
We define necessity by 
D 2 : M : = 2?(i4, -ii4), 
and unconditional belief by 
D3: BA: = B(A9 T), 
where ris a tautology. 
This concept of an interpretation of L B is based on the following con-
siderations: 
(1) U is to be taken as a set of possible objects. The different worlds in 
I may have different subsets Ut of U of existing objects. If E is a 1-place 
predicate constant of LB and we set 4>i(E) = Ui9 we can define universal 
quantification over actual instead of possible objects by A.xA[x]: = 
Ax(Ex^>A[x]). However, in the following, we shall not be concerned 
with existence. 
(2) b(i9 A) is to be the set of worlds, so that the person a referred to 
believes in i that in case of A, one of the elements of it is the real world, but 
he cannot say which one. So A for a is reason to believe that B iff 
b{i9 A) = [B\. 
Condition (3a) is evident: If a believes that A9 then all the worlds in 
b(i9 A) are ^-worlds. b(i9 A) is to be empty iff ^ 4 is considered impossible 
in Ï . Since St= Uxb{U X)9 St is the set of worlds that for a in i might be the 
real world under some condition, and St is a good candidate for the set 
of worlds considered possible by a in i. 
(3d) then says that i is considered possible in i . And we have 
(a) b(hA) = A = Sia[-iA]: 
From the definition of St and (3a) we have b(i9 A) = A if c [-}A], And 
if SiC\[A]¥=A then there is a B such that b(i9 B)r\ [A]^A9 so according 
to (3a, c) b(i9 AAB) = b(i, B)n[A]^A9 and in view of (3b) b(i9 A)^A. 
From D2 it follows that A is necessary in i iff S^c [A]. For if b(i9 -\A)a 
a[A]9 by (3a) we have b(i9 ~\A) = A9 so Stci[A] by (a). And if S £ c [A] 
then by(3a)6(i, ~iA)=c[A]. 
And if SfCz[A] then by (3a) b (/, iA) = Ac[A]. 
Finally we have by the definition of 5 f 
(JS) Stc YiSfor all Xb{i9 X)c Y9 
i.e. a proposition F i s necessary iff every proposition X\s reason to believe 
Y. 
Now (3b) says that if a proposition X is not impossible then Y is not 
impossible for Xa Y. (3c) is equivalent to b{i9 B) n [A] ^  A 3 b(/, A n 5) = 
=£( / , 5 ) n [^ 4], i.e. if 5 is not reason to believe that ~iA9 A A 5 is reason 
to believe that C iff 5 is reason to believe that A 3 C. 
A l l these postulates of D l can be derived from the semantics of A9 B^. 
C, i ) . Since such a comparative concept, restricted to sentences A9 B9 C9 D 
without the Operator <., can be metricized under a plausible assumption 
in the form of a conditional probability p with p (A9 B)^p(C9 D) = 
==A9 B^. C,D 9 we haveb(i9 X)={JY(p(Y9 X)= 1), from which we obtain 
the conditions D l , (3a), (3b), (3c) for b by the well-known axioms for p. 
(3) The postulate (3e) in D l gives a connection between the beliefs of a 
in different worlds. This postulate derives from the two principles 
B{A9 C) 3 BB{A9 C) 
- i B(A9 C) 3 B-i B(A9 C) . 
If C is (not) reason for a to believe that A9 then a has reason to believe 
that this is (not) so. For unconditional descriptive belief we have the 
principles BA 3 BBA - if a believes that A9 then a believes that he believes 
that A - he could scarcely doubt that - and analogously -IBAZDB~IBA. 
These principles carry over to rational belief and also to conditional 
belief. 
(4) (3f) implies that we interpret necessity in the manner of C I. Lewis' 
System S5. 
(5) Condition (4a) of D l implies that we interpret all individual con-
stants of L as Standard names. 
D4. A n interpretation 9Ji=<E/, / , g, <P> satisfies a sentence A in iel iff 
<^I{A)~t. A is valid in 9JI iflf 9JI satisfies A for all iel. And A is D-true 
{doxastically true) iff A is valid in all interpretations 9JI. 
We can formulate an axiom System 93 of the logic of conditional belief by 
adjoining the following axioms and rules to predicate logic: 
B l B(A,A) 
B2 NA 3 B(A, C) 
B3 N(A C) A B(A, D) => B(C, D) 
B4 B(A, C) A B(D, C) 3 B(A A D, C) 
B5 -\B(-IA, C) 3 (B(D, AAC) = B(A=> D, C) 
B6 NA^A 
B7 NA ^ NNA 
B8 -iNAz>N-iNA 
B9 B(A, C) => BB(A, C) 
BIO - i B(A, C) ^ B~\ B(A, C) 
B l l AxB(A [JC], C) => B{AxA [x], C) 
BR1 AVNA. 
© can be shown to be semantically consistent and complete. 
in 
A n indicative conditional is a sentence of the form "If it is the case that 
A, then it is the case that D " - symbolically C(Z), A). 
According to D . Lewis (1973) we can formulate the semantics and the 
logic of conditions in the following way: 
If LC is like LB with C instead of B, then an interpretation of LC is like 
an interpretation of LB with C substituted for B in D l , (4c), with the 
postulate 
(3d') ieb(i,I) 
instead of (3d) and with (3e) omitted. (3d') implies (3d) and 
(y) ieX^ ieb(i9 X) for all i e / , 
since from (3c) and (3d') we obtain ieX=>b(i9 X)—b(i9 I)nX9 and there-
fore ieb(i, X). 
We obtain a logic of conditionals (£ corresponding to this concept of an 
LC-interpretation from 93 by reading C everywhere for B, omitting B9 
and BIO and substituting 
(B6') C(A9B)r>(B^A) 
for B6. B6' entails B6. 3 
According to the ideas of Stalnaker in (1968) and Lewis in (1973) 
b{i9 A) in the case of conditionals is to be interpreted as the set of A-
worlds most similar to /. They start from comparative relations j < Je on I 
for all iel - world j is at most as similar to i as world k. Then under the 
Limit-Assumption4 that for all i and A there is an /4-world that is most 
similar to i b(i9 Ä) may be defined in this sense. The Limit-Assumption is 
not very plausible, as Lewis points out, but at least it makes no difference 
for the resulting logic. If we start from the relation j^tkf however, it is 
very plausible that j is more similar to itself than to any other world. 
This gives us 
(/) /elDi(/J) = {/} 
instead of (y), i.e. in Lewis' terminology strong instead of weak centering. 
From (ƒ) we obtain AABZ>C{A9 B). This is harmless for counterfac-
tuals C(A9 B) which are normally only used with the presupposition ~\B9 
but not for indicative conditionals and it is quite unacceptable for causal 
Statements "It is the case that A, since it is the case that B" since it would 
make them all true. Therefore, if (£ is to be a general logic for conditionals, 
weak centering, i.e. (y) is advocated. Since this is implausible with the 
interpretation of b(i9 A) given above, I have proposed a different inter-
pretation of this set in my paper (1974) which does not refer to a compar-
ative relation of similarity for worlds. C(A9 B) is interpreted there as 
"Under condition that B it is necessary that A". We then have to distinguish 
weak necessity from strong necessity. Weak necessity of A means roughly 
that prima facie A is normally the case. Weak necessity is defined by 
D5 CA: = C(A9 T)9 where Tis a tautology. 
C(A9 B) says that A is (weakly) necessary or normally the case on con-
dition that B. 
Strong necessity is weak necessity under any circumstances and can be 
defined by NA: = C{A9 ~iA). 
Then b(i9 A) is the set of worlds (weakly) possible on condition that A9 
from the Standpoint of worlds i. 
A n interpretation of b(i9A) by a comparative relation of similarity 
between worlds suggests no principles relating the sets b(i9 A) and b(J9 Ä) 
for iVy, i.e. no principles for iterated applications of the operator C. 
Besides local uniformity - our condition D l , (3f)- Lewis in (1973, p. 120) 
discusses only 
(a) Local Absoluteness: jeSi=>b(i9 X) = b(j9 X) for all i9 jel and 
Xcz ƒ, which is too strong since it gives C{A9 B) = NC(A9 B)9 
~iC(A9 B) = N-iC(A9 B)9 CA = NA and C(A9 B) = N(Bz>A)9 
(b) Universality: St = ƒ, for all ieI; 
(c) Weak triviality: b(i9 X) = ƒ for all iel; 
and 
(d) Triviality: / = {i}. 
Universality makes no difference as to validity in view of Uniformity. 
With Triviality, weak or otherwise, Conditional Logic collapses. 
Interpreting conditionals as Statements about conditional necessity 
suggests conditional analoga to B7 and B8. Substituting C for B in B9 and 
BIO gives the most likely candidates. C(A9 B) 3 NC(A9 B) and ~ i C(A9 B) r> 
=>N-iC(A9 B) would imply local absoluteness; C(A9 B)z>C(C(A9 B)9 B) 
and iC(A9 B)zz>C(-\C{A9 B)9 B) do not seem right, since if on condi-
tion that B9 A is necessary or not necessary, this does not depend on con-
dition B. 
In view of (3d') and B6' not every concept of belief is a model of (£. 
But we can define correct beliefs by the condition B(A9 C)z> (Cz>A) for 
all sentences A and C. We call an L2?-interpretation correct iff (3d') holds, 
since B(A, C)=>(C=>A) is valid in all such interpretations. 
Correct beliefs, therefore, constitute a model for (E, and since for cor-
rect beliefs we have B(A, C)zoK(A9 C) , where we define conditional 
knowledge K(A, C)-C is reason to know that A - by 
D6 K(A, Q; = B(A, C)A(CZ>A) 
in analogy to KA: = BAAA> we can speak of an epistemic instead of a 
doxastic model of (£. 
I V 
In the introduction we noted that an epistemic interpretation of condi-
tionals may give us new insight into the formal properties of conditionals. 
This presupposes, of course, that the epistemic interpretation of condi-
tionals is a natural one. The logic of conditional Obligation has, for in-
stance, the same formal structure as that of conditional belief, but we 
would not regard deontic interpretations of conditionals as natural and 
would not therefore try to justify postulates for conditionals by principles 
from deontic logic. The question of how natural is an epistemic interpre-
tation of conditionals is postponed to the next section. Let us take a 
positive answer for granted, at the moment. 
23, as a logic of correct belief with B6' instead of B6, contains only two 
principles that do not occur in the better known logies of conditionals 5 : 
B9 and BIO; and even they are suggested, as we have seen, by the inter-
pretation of conditionals as statements about conditional necessity. The 
epistemic interpretation of conditionals therefore does not produce any 
new principles; still, it is a welcome confirmation of these two axioms. 
How plausible are these axioms? 
From B9 and BIO we obtain 
(<5) CC(AYB)v C~iC(A,B) 
and with B5 
00 n C n ^ D (C(C(B, D), A) = C(B, D)) and 
(O n C n C(A9 B) ZD (C(D, C(A, B)) = CD). 
Take the following examples: 
(1) If John will come, then if Jack will come too, it will be a lively 
party. 
(2) Ifin case John will come, Jack will come too, it will be a lively 
party. 
According to (e), if it is (weakly) possible that John will come, then (1) is 
equivalent to 
(3) IfJack will come, it will be a lively party. 
And according to (0, if it is (weakly) possible that if John comes, 
Jack will come too, then (2) is equivalent to 
(4) (Prima facie) it will be a lively party. 
This is intuitively not very convincing. We should rather have expected 
(1) to be equivalent with 
(5) If John and Jack will come, it will be a lively party, 
under the condition that Jack's coming is (weakly) possible if John is 
coming (so that Jack is not disposed to stay away if John comes). Under 
this condition ( - i C ( n / ) , A)) we have C(C(5 , £>), A)ZDC(B9 D AA)9 but 
no equivalence. 
I think, however, that these two examples - or other examples from 
ordinary language - are not convincing counter-examples for B9 and BIO, 
either. Just as we have no reliable intuition concerning iterated modalities, 
we have no intuitive criteria of truth for ordinary language sentences of 
the form C(A9 C(B9 /))), C(C(A9 B)9 D) or C(C(A9 B)9 C(D9 E)). Such 
sentences are very rare, and we are at a loss to explain the difference in 
meaning, for instance, between (1), (2) and (5). It therefore seems best 
either to exclude such sentences altogether or to accept principles that 
allow the elimination of iterated "if-then"s in as many instances as pos-
sible, just as in S5. 
A l l this is no strong evidence that an epistemic interpretation of con-
ditionals produces interesting new principles of Conditional Logic. But if 
we want to have axioms like B9 or BIO, every additional evidence thereof 
is welcome. 
v 
A conditional C(A9 D) may be asserted by a person a in a subjectively 
correct way iff BA(A9 D) (i.e. B(A9 D) holds with respect to a). If for a D 
is reason to believe that A9 then a is justified in asserting that A if D. And 
if for a D is not a reason to believe that A9 then a may not assert that A if 
D. This, however, does not imply that C(A9 D) may be interpreted to 
mean that Ba(A9 J9). This is obvious if we refer to the beliefs of individual 
persons; first, the parameter a in Ba(A9 D) does not occur in C(A9 D)9 and 
a definition C(A, D): = Ba(A, D) would therefore be incorrect and give 
rise to contradictions, Axy(Bx(A9 D) = By(A9 D)) not being valid. 
Secondly, Ba(A9 D) may have a truth-value different from C(A9 D). 
But let us assume that in the Community P speaking the language L , to 
which the sentences C(A9 D) belong, there are common rational and 
correct beliefs, shared by almost all, which are expressed by the operator 
B. Then C(A9 D) may be asserted in P iff B(A9 D). But does this imply 
that C(A9 D) means the same as B(A9 D)l Assertibility conditions have 
to be distinguished from truth conditions. Truth conditions, but not 
assertibility conditions determine the meaning of a sentence. 
The distinction between truth conditions and conditions of assertibility 
is of course systematically important. But in the present case this distinc-
tion collapses. If we accept the principles of assertibility - formulated as 
principles of belief -
(1) B(A9 D) = BC(A9 D) and - i B(A9 D)=>B~i C(A9 D) 
and the postulate of correctness of B 
(2) B(A9 /))=>(/)=> A)9 and therefore BA => A9 
we obtain 
(3) B(A9D)^C(A9D)9 
i.e., an epistemic interpretation of conditionals. 
It might be said that (3) still does not imply that C(A9 D) and B(Ay D) 
have the same meaning, but in the framework of our semantics of B and 
C, we have been talking about meanings only in the approximation of 
intensions, and we are therefore quite satisfied with an intensional equiv-
alence of B(A9 D) and C(A9 D). 
Generally speaking, the distinction between conditions of assertibility 
and truth conditions is not so clear as it seems to be. "There is no distinc-
tion of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference 
of practice" said Peirce, and we say that the meaning of a sentence A is 
determined by the Conventions for its use in a linguistic Community P. A 
convention for (the use of) A9 according to D . Lewis (1969), is a regularity 
in the behavior of the members of P. This behavior depends on what they 
believe. Thus, even if they widerstand this convention so that A may be 
uttered iff it is the case that B, i.e. if the use of A9 for them, is governed 
by truth conditions, how they actually use A does not directly depend on 
the truth value of B but on what they believe about B. If, for instance, the 
members of P understand the convention for A so that A may be uttered 
iff A B2, but they all believe that in all instances of B2 Bx is normally the 
case, then a person not belonging to P who does not believe this, will ob-
serve that they use A in case of B2 (independently of Bx) and will there-
fore understand A as expressing B2 to be the case. For him that is the 
truth condition for A. Therefore, as long as we do not refer to the beliefs 
of single subjects but to the common beliefs in P, the linguistic behavior 
and the use of the language are determined by the conditions of asser-
tibility ; these determine its meaning, and the distinction between the truth 
conditions of a sentence and its assertibility conditions in P will become 
void, if we have to say that the truth conditions for A in P are truth 
conditions relative to the common beliefs of the members of P. 
There is still another reason to take a more lenient view of an epistemic 
interpretation of conditionals. Let us first take a look at another better 
known case: The subjective interpretation of probability. The truth 
conditions of a Statement P(F) = r- the objective probability of an event 
of type F equals r - have never been adequately stated in a purely objec-
tivist fashion. The interpretation of p(F) by Mises as the limit of the 
relative frequencies r{n)jn of F's in a series of n trials has been criticized 
on many points, one of them being that infinite series of trials are never 
realised - not only are they unobservable, but they are physically im-
possible. We may therefore merely say that JP(F) is the limit of the relative 
frequencies that would be reached, if an infinite series of trials could be 
realized. In that case, however, the value of P(F) is an object not of 
physical inquiry but of our belief. As Peirce remarked, the question of 
what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise is not 
a matter of fact but only of our systematisation of facts. Instead of truth 
conditions we have, however, conditions of assertibility that determine 
the use of the concept of objective probability on which we are well 
agreed, for instance, the (weak) law of great numbers 
(4) Ae(e<0zDlimn^^p({x:\hn(F9x)-P(F)\>8} = l)9 
where p is a subjective probability measure, the x's are infinite series of 
possible results of a t r ia l 6 and hn(Fx) is the relative frequency of F's in the 
first n members of x. 
The subjective probability p here apparently cannot be taken to express 
just anyone's opinions. Let p' be any subjective probability for which the 
events Fal9Fa29... are interchangeable i.e. pf(Fan A ... AFa i r)=p'(Fa j l 
A ... AFajn) for all «-tuples (il9...9 i„) and (jw~>jn)* We then can define 
p'(F):=p'(Fai) for any /. Then, as B. de Finetti has shown, there is a 
function h(F9 x) so that/?'({x: l i m n ^ 0 0 hn(F9 x) = A(F, *)})= 1, i.e., practic-
ally for all sequences x there is a limit of the relative frequencies of F's in x. If 
<P(F9z):=p'({x:h(F9 x)^z}) and if p is regulär, i.e., if d$(F ,z )#0 
everywhere so that no value of h(F9 x) is a priori considered impossible 
according to p'9 then lim^^ip'(Fan^.l9 Ar„) — rn) = 09 where Arn says that, 
in the events Fax,..., Fan r F's have occurred. 
This implies that for all p' if the F's are interchangeable with respect to 
p' and p' is regulär, the functions p'(B9A$ converge with increasing 
numbers n of observations of F's, so that they have a common value 
p{F). p(F) then is a sort of "epistemic" probability, on which we agree if 
we have enough common experience concerning the outcomes of F's - a 
subjective probability objectivized by experience. And, in view of p(F) = 
= z = ^ l £ ( £ > 0 3 l i m n _ Q O p({x:\hn(F9 je) — z\ <ß})= 1, we have p{F)—P(F) 
according to (4). There is therefore an epistemic interpretation for 
objective probability, and since two persons agreeing as to (4) use P{F) in 
the same way it is questionable whether we can construe a difference of 
meaning between them. However, we can at least say, that the "epistemi-
cist" is better off than the "objectivist", since he knows what he is talking 
about when talking about objective probabilities. 
The problem with conditionals is somewhat similar. There seems to be 
no way to explain the truth conditions for statements about necessity, 
conditional or otherwise, in "objectivist" notions. First we do not have an 
operative definition of C. In view of the principle C(A9 B)-=>{B^A) we 
can falsify such Statements by observations. But we cannot thereby 
justify them. As Hume has pointed out, there is nothing in an Observa-
tion of the fact that A which would characterize it as necessary or con-
tingent. And how could we justify a Statement that A holds in all possible 
worlds, or in all worlds possible under condition that B1 
A possible world is no distant cosmos, which we would have to visit to 
ascertain by Observation whether A is true there or not. Our world, 
according to Wittgenstein, is the set of facts, i.e., of propositions which 
hold true in our world. A world, then, is a set W of propositions that is 
consistent and maximal (so that if p is not in PFthen i p is). In our defini-
tion, D l the "set of worlds" I is a set of indices for worlds, and the propo-
sition p is represented as the set of indices iel of worlds Wx so that pe Wt. 
It is then not a question of fact - whether a sentence A is true in i - but of 
the definition of Wt. If we have defined the sets b(i9 B) it is, consequently, 
not problematic if b(i9 B)cz [A]. But if we want to know whether C(A9 B) 
is true in our world, we should know which of the worlds W% with iel is 
our world; having only limited information about our world, all we can 
say is that it belongs to some set / ' c : / , which will still be very inclusive. 
Only if for all jel' b(j9 B)a [A] could we say, on the basis of our informa-
tion, that C(A9 B) is true in our world. 
The empirical problem of justifying a statement C(A9 B) therefore 
refers only to our world, the real world - there is no question of meta-
physical observations - but it is such that we cannot claim, except in 
trivial cases, that C(A9 B) is true on the basis of limited information 
about our world. 
The problem of ascertaining by Observation whether C(A9 B) is true, 
however, is not the same problem as furnishing objective truth conditions 
for C(A9 B). In the case of general statements AxF(x) there is a corre-
sponding Humean problem of justifying such statements by only finite 
observations, but there we usually see no difficulty in furnishing objective 
truth conditions.7 
Conditional necessity is an objectivist notion if we can define or explain 
the sets b(i9 A) by other objectivist concepts. Let us interpret b(i9 B) as the 
set of 5-worlds most similar to /, in the fashion of R. Stalnaker and D . 
Lewis. This similarity is not defined with respect to some properties of 
the worlds - that all or not all of them contain certain propositions - but 
it is an overall similarity. Lewis compares our faculty to diagnose such 
overall similarities of worlds with our faculty to detect overall similarities 
in such sizable and variegated objects as cities or people. But statements 
such as "San Francisco is more similar to Los Angeles than to Boston" 
or "Swedes are more similar to Turks than to Spaniards", without further 
specifications as to the aspect of comparison, are too vague to be infor-
mative or have a definite truth value. Conditional statements would then 
presumably be as totally vague as are those about the overall similarity 
of other worlds with ours, of which we enjoy no overall knowledge. 
While Statements about the similarity of people can be rendered more 
precise by stating the area of their asserted similarity, i.e., by foregoing 
the pretense of overall similarity for which there are no criteria, this 
is explicitly excluded in the case of conditionals on Lewis' analysis. Also, 
worlds, unlike cities or people, are abstract entities which do not impress 
us as having a certain total character. 
The similarity of two worlds i and j, according to Lewis, is determined 
not only by the wealth of details which they share but also by the impor-
tance of the propositions common to both 8 . Now importance is not only 
a "highly volatile matter", as Lewis (quoting Goodman) remarks but 
also a highly subjective term. We generally call something "important" 
with respect to some person or persons or their aims, and we would be at a 
loss to understand a statement that something was important per se, 
irrespective of its importance for anyone. 
If we choose the notion of relative necessity as basic notion instead of 
similarity, I cannot see any way how this concept may be explained in an 
objectivist way, just as I do not see that unconditional (strong) necessity, 
discussed for centuries, has ever been accounted for in objectivist terms. 
We have a fairly good understanding of what might be the case if some-
thing eise were the case. But this seems to be based solely on our common 
expectations, on our systematisations of the facts and our preferences, 
according to which some of them are more firmly established, more central, 
more important than others. As in the case of objective probability, we 
can again say: Since the "epistemicist" and the "objectivist" agree in 
their use of conditionals, it is doubtful that a difference may be con-
strued in the way they understand them. And as long as no "objectivist" 
interpretation of conditional necessity is forthcoming, the "epistemicist" 
has the advantage over the "objectivist" of knowing what he says when 
asserting a conditional. 
I expect that conditionals are only one example out of a larger class of 
intensional statements which, though objective in their content and not 
explicitly involving beliefs and preferences, have to be interpreted in the 
light of common beliefs and preferences. But that is another story. 
Universität Regensburg 
NOTES 
1 A logic of comparative conditional probability was first formulated in B. O. Koopman 
(1940). Koopman also proved that such a comparative structure can be metricized by 
a conditional probability p obeying the usual axioms, so that p(A> 2?)<p(C, D) = 
~A7B^.C>D. For a brief exposition of epistemic logic, cf. Kutschera, forthcoming, 
chapter 4. 
2 For the sake of brevity we use the logical operators of our object-Ianguage LB also 
as metalinguistic symbols. 
3 So far, aside from B7, B8 and Bi l , (T is equivalent to D. Lewis' System VW; cf. 
Lewis (1973, pp. 132 seq.) 
4 Cf. Lewis (1973, pp. 57 seq.) 
5 Lewis' System (1973) is formulated for propositional logic only, so Bi l is missing 
there too. In Stalnaker's System (in 1968) there is the additional principle C(A, B)A 
f\C(-\A, B)y which is too strong. Cf. Lewis' criticism in (1973, p. 80.) 
6 There is no presupposition here that such infinite sequences could ever be realized 
by sucessive trials. 
7 In traditional philosophy, however, generality was a modal notion closely connected 
with necessity. A fresh look at this conception, I think, would be rewarding. 
8 Cf. Lewis (1973, pp. 91 seq.) 
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